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I. Introduction
The 1986 winner of the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences was James 
M. Buchanan.  His work has covered a wide range of areas in economics, 
starting with Public Finance. He helped to create the new sub-disciplines of 
Public Choice,(1) and Constitutional Political Economy, and to some extent New 
Institutional Economics.  In this paper I want to discuss a work by Buchanan 
called Property as a Guarantor of Freedom (Buchanan 1993) which represents 
a sort of paradox, given the rest of his oeuvre. Before discussing this work, 
however, I need to provide some background on Buchanan’s work and his 
foundational assumptions.
As early as the 1950s we can see the outlines of Buchanan’s ‘contractarian’ 
approach to economics. He began to advocate understanding markets in a ‘gains-
from-trade’ framework; potential gains, of course, had to be secured by enforced 
contracts (1959, p.129). Within a few years Buchanan was calling for economics 
to focus on catallactics, or exchange (1964, p.214).(2) The next step was to take 
the exchange approach and apply it to politics. As politics was now viewed 
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Buchanan’s Public Choice contributions are part of the tradition of economics as imperialistic 
social science (see Duhs 2005). One major consequence of that work is to take economics 
further away from the two strands of the ethical tradition outlined by Sen (1987, pp. 2-7). Self-
interested behaviour is now hypothesized in new areas.  Bureaucrats, politicians and voters are 
assumed to ‘utility maximize’ but the results are not socially benefi cial. Hence, ‘government 
failure’ is endemic.
Buchanan was following in the tradition of Whately and others.  See Kirzner 1960, Ch 4.
(1)
(2)
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as another type of exchange, the polity was seen in terms of a social contract. 
Thus, his exchange/contract/gains-from-trade approach was foundational for 
his constitutional political economy programme. By 1975 Buchanan’s mature 
view had emerged in ‘A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic 
Theory’ (Buchanan 1975). He argued that the contract perspective had to be 
extended to cover all economic and political relationships.(3) It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Buchanan’s Nobel Prize was awarded ‘for his development of 
the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political 
decision-making.’ 
In my view, there are eleven foundational assumptions in Buchanan’s 
work.  In this paper I will provide a summary of that discussion. Some 
assumptions underpin all of his work; others are adapted to the particular 
context.  Buchanan’s foundational assumptions fall into two groups. The fi rst 
six relate to the individual in isolation or in the interactions in markets. The 
remaining fi ve assumptions refer to the individual in a market or social choice 
setting.
First, Buchanan holds strict subjectivism: that there is no distinction 
between the individual’s utility function and his behaviour (1991, p.225). 
Individual choice is all that there is (1991, pp.225-6). Second, Buchanan 
assumes methodological individualism: only autonomous individuals choose and 
act; social infl uences are limited (1987, p.586; 1991, p.14).  Third, he says ‘the 
ultimate sources of value’ originate ‘exclusively in individuals’ (1987, p.586). 
(See also assumption eight below.) Buchanan adopts a more nuanced view in 
his recent work on culture (see Buchanan 1994). Fourth, he puts supreme value 
on freedom. For Buchanan, the goal is maximal freedom within the constraints 
one gives oneself individually or by agreement with others (the incorporation 
of ethical constraints consistent with one’s interests tends to be the focus of his 
later works). Fifth, he assumes homo economicus i.e. individuals ‘seek their own 
interests’ defi ned in a ‘non-tautological’ way (1987, p.587). Sixth, Buchanan 
Buchanan’s approach (in markets and in politics) was to start from the status quo and look for 
Pareto gains.
(3)
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assumes rational choice i.e. all economic agents are able to choose between 
alternatives in an ‘orderly manner’ (1991, p.15).
Seventh, cooperative behaviour can secure mutual gains (1964, p.218). 
Exchange, trade, and specialization are what he has in mind by ‘cooperation.’ 
Gains from trade is one of the main themes of Buchanan’s economics. Eighth, 
Buchanan holds ‘normative individualism,’ which assumes that ‘individuals are 
the ultimate sovereigns in matters of social organization’ (1991, p.225, 227). 
Ninth, the political unit is assumed to be a manifestation of a social contract. 
Tenth, in social decision making, he attributes ‘equal weighting’ to ‘individual 
evaluations’; Buchanan is a democrat (1991, p.16). Finally, to prevent abuses 
by democratic majorities, Buchanan adopts constitutional democracy (1987, 
p.586). In various areas, he recommends rules which are stricter than the simple 
majority rule (1959, pp.127-8, p.135, 137; 1991, p.47).
The remainder of this paper has two sections. Section 2 presents 
Buchanan’s argument in Property as a Guarantor of Freedom. Section 3 
presents a critique of that view in the light of other work in his oeuvre.
II. A Summary of Property as a Guarantor of Freedom
There are two institutional arrangements required for the specialization-
market-exchange nexus to work: limited collective action and private property. 
Although these institutions are interdependent, my focus will be on property. 
Buchanan defends private property on two grounds. First, it permits effi ciency 
gains and promotes economic growth; this is the argument of mainstream 
economists. Second, he argues over some sixty pages of text in Property as a 
Guarantor of Freedom that private property is a ‘means of protecting the liberty 
of persons’ (1993, p.41). This argument about property is worth developing for 
three reasons: it is important in its own right as an ethical argument; it shows 
Buchanan’s focus on freedom; and in presenting his argument, Buchanan reveals 
to us desirable limits on the market.(4)
Just as there are desirable limits on intrusion by government on individual freedom, Buchanan 
now tells us that there are desirable limits on intrusion by markets.
(4)
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Buchanan presents his argument through a conjectural history of the 
world;(5) the story unfolds through a set of historical ‘stages.’ Buchanan begins 
with the Hobbesian state of war, where no private property exists (1993, p.4; 
Hobbes 1968). In the second stage we are transported to a Lockean world, where 
private property and associated institutions emerge in a pre-political state; some 
collective agreement, however, is needed to establish property boundaries (1993, 
p.9; Locke 1988). Individuals achieve ‘maximal independence’ and ‘maximal 
effi ciency in resource or capacity use’ (1993, p.10). Even so, potential ‘boundary 
crossings,’ necessitate an ‘enforcing authority’ with ‘powers to identify, 
defi ne, and punish lawbreakers’ (1993, p.11). The state protects property; it 
is ‘a watchman, night or day’ (1993, p.12). This image of the state is close to 
Buchanan’s heart (see Buchanan 2000). 
In the third stage of history, autarky is abandoned. Some specialization 
in production begins (production benefi ts from what Buchanan calls 
increasing returns)(6) along with ‘mutually advantageous trades’; specialization 
requires some ‘sacrifi ce of independence’ but that loss is more than offset by 
consumption gains (1993, pp.14-5). ‘[T]he legal structure is extended to the 
enforcement of voluntary contracts between’ individuals and to the ‘prevention 
of fraud’ (1993, p.16). As specialization increases, dependence on others 
increases but Buchanan says that ‘there is no loss of liberty’ where this is 
‘defi ned … as the absence of coercion by others’; ‘entry into the specialization-
exchange nexus remains voluntary’ (1993, p.16 emphasis added).(7)
Next, Buchanan elaborates on the linkages between market dependence, 
This account differs in fundamental respects from that developed in Buchanan 2000.  He 
admits, however, that he is not wedded to any specifi c ‘conjectural history’ (Buchanan 2000, 
p.140).
In recent writings, Buchanan has frequently adopted what he calls the assumption of increasing 
returns.  See, for example, his writings on the work ethic (e.g. 1994).  The theory of increasing 
(and decreasing and constant) returns is actually set in a static framework, whereas Buchanan’s 
concept is set in a dynamic context (see Birks 2007, p.9).
Is this a sort of sophistic argument?  In the new environment the choices are fundamentally 
different.  (It is analogous to the shadow of the law.)  In this new context, what does ‘liberty’ 
mean? and what does ‘voluntary’ mean?
(5)
(6)
(7)
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justice in exchange, exploitation, and private property (some of the central 
concerns of ancient/medieval writers and Karl Marx). At this stage, even 
though ‘there is no coercion, the individual’s well-being’ varies depending upon 
the actions of others (1993, p.18). He suggests that in this context, ‘terms of 
exchange’ between the parties come to be ‘classifi ed as just or unjust’ (1993, 
p.18). Participants feel that ‘potential for exploitation’ exists, ‘defi ned vaguely 
as some … unbalanced sharing of the gains that exchange makes possible’ 
(1993, p.18). Such a view, of course, is a long way from Aristotle and Marx. 
Despite his disquiet about the talk of ‘exploitation’ (compare Buchanan, 1977, 
pp.70-1), Buchanan continues to use the term throughout the discussion. 
Should unfavourable terms of trade result from ‘the market’s “blind forces,”’ 
private property ownership of labour and land allows the owner to ‘exit’ from 
‘exploitation’ (1993, p.19; see p.18). In the ‘fully competitive economy,’ with 
all the associated ‘legal-institutional structure,’(8) the individual secures ‘the full 
advantages of specialization’ and ‘the equivalent of costless exit options’ (1993, 
p.20). Potential for ‘exploitation’ decreases as the number of producers and 
buyers increase (1993, p.23). At the limit, where many buyers and sellers exist, 
each person becomes a ‘price taker’; room for genuine negotiation is eliminated 
(1993, p.20). To the person confronted by ‘objective’ prices, behaviour is ‘as 
if ’ market ‘interdependence [in the act of bilateral exchange] does not exist’ 
(1993, p.20).(9) Vulnerability to sudden shifts in prices, however, is real and exit 
from the market remains the ‘back-up,’ at least where ‘private property rights … 
allow voluntary withdrawal’ (1993, p.16, 25).  Thus, private property prevents 
exploitation.
In the fourth stage of history, Buchanan broadens his explanation for the 
gains from specialization and exchange to include ‘individual skills, capacities, 
and talents’ (1993, p.25). ‘[L]earning by doing’ plays an important role (1993, 
In this context, Buchanan refers to ‘viable entry and exit into all value-producing activities’ 
and a market of suffi cient size that there are many buyers and sellers (1993, p.20).
In other writings, Buchanan says that strategic (game-theoretic) interactions are actually the 
better way of viewing human interactions (1975; 1991, p.29, pp.31-2).
(8)
(9)
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p.25). Buchanan’s twist on this recently acknowledged cause of growth(10) is 
that despite becoming more productive in their specialization, in all of the other 
activities required for a self-suffi cient life (recall stages 1 and 2 above) ‘they 
forget by not doing’ (1993, p.26). Increased productivity in one’s specialization 
is achieved by sacrifi cing all-roundedness (productivity in all other areas). On the 
one hand, exit becomes more and more costly in terms of loss of productivity; 
on the other hand, staying in the market means increasing vulnerability to 
the vagaries of the market’s effective demand for one’s specialization (1993, 
p.26). The limit of the former is reached where one’s production knowledge is 
restricted to one thing and exit from the market to autarky (self-production of 
just one’s specialization) would result in one’s physical demise (1993, p.26). 
That limit, Buchanan says, has been reached by almost everyone ‘in the complex 
modern economy’ (1993, p.27). Hence, in advanced capitalist economies there 
would seem to be great potential for ‘exploitation.’
Even in this setting, however, providing that markets are kept open and 
one has a property right over one’s own body, Buchanan says that protection 
for people is offered by ‘two complementing sets of property rights’ (1993, 
p.29). First, possible exploitation is diminished through the potential to sell 
labour services to various demanders (1993, pp.28-9, 46-7, p.57). Second, the 
person may become an organizer of a production unit purchasing labour services 
from others (1993, pp.28-9, p.57). A ‘supplementary condition’ required ‘for 
a competitive environment’ is that the market be large enough for multiple 
buyers and sellers to exist (1993, p.29). Potential ‘exploitation’ is much more 
likely to occur with respect to demand for one’s labour services than supply 
of goods for one’s consumption; even the former potentiality, however, can be 
largely avoided when private property rights are fully available. The right to 
‘shift among’ and ‘within occupational, industrial, and locational categories’ 
constitutes an ‘enhanced right of exit’ (1993, p.30). Exit from the particular 
exploitative market provides freedom from coercion, because one can enter 
This factor is now gaining acceptance in endogenous growth theory (or new growth theory) 
(Arrow 1962).
(10)
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other markets which are not exploitative.
In both the third and the fourth stages of history, Buchanan discusses the 
idealized view of markets of economists and contrasts that with what actual 
market participants perceive to be the reality. In the competitive ideal, everyone 
is a price-taker, and hence ‘no person exerts arbitrary power over another’ (1993, 
p.32 emphasis added). This is normatively attractive but the standard analysis 
is incomplete, according to Buchanan. It only supports private property on the 
basis of incentive and effi ciency considerations; it ignores the liberty-enhancing
role of private property seen above in Buchanan’s discussion of ‘exploitative’ 
terms of trade (see 1993, p.32). People prefer to own, rather than rent, houses, 
cars, and so on, even if the rental or leasing options are cheaper on a strict 
fi nancial calculus (1993, p.33).(11) People ‘place a positive value on’ exit, on 
‘the liberty of the withdrawal from the market … that private property makes 
possible’ (1993, p.34; see also Buchanan’s comment on his own ‘utility function’ 
in Buchanan 1995).(12)
Buchanan then develops another characteristic of private property. The 
home owner effectively ‘produces’ his or her ‘own housing services’ (similarly 
the motor vehicle owner provides his or her own transportation services) and, by 
doing so, effectively opts out of market transactions to provide them (1993, p.35). 
The problem of interdependence is overcome by self-production and private 
property permits this exit to ‘self-suffi ciency’ (1993, p.35). Self-production of 
various types is very important if the individual becomes unemployed; it greatly 
reduces ‘the vulnerability’ to such market shocks (1993, p.37). Full ownership 
of housing and consumer durables reduces the income fl ow (and labour input) 
needed to provide for one’s consumption.(13)
(11)
(12)
(13)
In this argument, the homo economicus assumption (assumption 5) seems to be reduced to a 
tautology.
Strictly, speaking, private property ownership can also reduce liberty. For example, home 
ownership reduces liquidity and mobility.
Of course, for most people, the mortgage burden is something they live with for most of their 
lives. So, it really is the motor vehicle example which is generally more relevant.
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Next, the argument is extended to consider private ownership of ‘assets that 
yield money income’ and temporal adjustments ‘in fl ows of income and outlay’ 
(1993, p.38, 41). The former reduces the necessity to provide labour to the 
market in order to satisfy consumption needs (1993, p.38). In the latter case, life-
cycle and intergenerational savings necessitate ‘partitionable claims to value, or 
property’ (1993, p.41). Private property is needed even for those who don’t fear 
‘exploitation’ by the market but who do plan for the future (1993, p.42).(14)
III. Conclusion
For Buchanan, markets and exchange allow self-interest to be pursued but 
they are also ethical. Throughout the argument he shouts that these arrangements 
remain ‘voluntary’; potential exit from the arrangements is the strongest proof 
that they provide mutual gains.(15) Some collective action is needed to secure 
private property and enforcement of contracts. Nevertheless, this specialization-
market-exchange-private property nexus is ethical (it is in the common good). 
The great threat to freedom comes from government.(16) The conditions required 
for a minimal (ethical) government are discussed by him elsewhere (Buchanan, 
2000).
What is interesting and perplexing about Buchanan’s account in Property 
as a Guarantor of Freedom is that at seventy-fi ve years of age he presents 
(14)
(15)
(16)
This argument leads to the conclusion that there must be a ‘monetary constitution’ (part of the 
broader economic constitution) to prevent potential ‘exploitation by the state’ due to its ability 
to ‘manipulate the terms of trade between money and goods’ (1993, pp.44-5, p.56, 59).  See 
Buchanan and Wagner 1975, pp.63-4; Buchanan and Wagner 2000, p.9, pp.182-93.
Individuals make their choices within the given environment. Did they choose the 
environment? This is certainly not the case. Nevertheless, Buchanan seems to be of the view 
that the market environment is just and could have arisen behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ 
(Rawls 1971, p.12).  Is that what everyone thinks?
Government is supposed to secure private property, enforce contracts and provide economic 
freedom. It is also the great threat to these things. Hence, it is a necessity and a threat. 
The social contract (see assumption 9) is designed to provide citizens with the benefi ts of 
government, while minimizing the risks from it.  Buchanan discuses these issues at length in 
Buchanan 2000.
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circumstances in which people rationally choose to exit from the market: they 
opt out of exchange. Speaking loosely one could say that in such cases freedom 
is more important than exchange. More precisely, gains from trade in these cases 
are now less than losses from trade. Is Property as a Guarantor of Freedom
a detour from Buchanan’s lifelong commitment to gains from trade? Or is it 
merely stating something that Buchanan conveniently kept under wraps for so 
many years?
Property as a Guarantor of Freedom does not present an explicit case for 
tariffs and protectionism (Buchanan opposes these in other writings(17)). Nor is it 
implicit, providing that one avoids taking the ‘organismic’ view of the society or 
the state (Buchanan, 1949, p.496). On the other hand, many people do think in 
these ‘organismic’ terms.(18) Buchanan’s argument is likely to be misinterpreted 
therefore. I will develop this point shortly.
In any event, if people increasingly feel that freedom from trade exceeds 
the benefi ts of trade, Buchanan surely must accept that less international trade, 
and less national trade, would be a good thing. Can an individual’s ‘preference’ 
for trading (at the margin) change? Is this possible within Buchanan’s world-
view?  Yes.  Can such a preference change of an individual be part of a general 
trend in preference changes in Buchanan’s framework? Yes. There is a clear 
analogy here to some of Buchanan’s work on the Puritan ethics. In his work on 
the Puritan ethics he shows that preferences are variable and that they can be 
shaped by ‘preaching’ (1994, Ch 3). Indeed, Buchanan proposes that preferences 
be altered by ‘preaching’ the Puritan ethics: hard work, hard savings, and so on. 
Consider one example where ‘preaching’ is designed to alter preferences of 
many individuals. In recent years there have been active campaigns promoting 
(17)
(18)
In this context, see: his praise of ‘spontaneous coordination’; his praise of the ‘de-politicized’ 
British economy ‘in the late 18th and early 19th centuries’; and his opposition to the ‘politicized 
mercantilist economy’ (1987, pp.585-6).
In Buchanan 1949 he describes two visions of the state. In the ‘organismic’ view, ‘the state, 
including all individuals within it, is conceived as a single organic entity’ (1949, p.496). 
Buchanan also discusses the ‘individualistic’ view, in which ‘[t]he state has no ends other than 
those of its individual members’ (1949, p.498).  The latter view he adopts.
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the purchasing of locally-grown foods. The promotion of ‘eco-footprint’ 
measures and ‘food miles’ are clear signs that the sale of food in distant places 
will increasingly get a bad image. In addition, there are various government-
led campaigns to buy locally (even though many of the same governments 
nominally support free trade through membership of the World Trade 
Organization). Effi cient (and healthy)(19) food producers (such as Australia and 
New Zealand) will fi nd exporting food over long distances (e.g. to the European 
Union) more and more diffi cult in such an environment. Given these types of 
‘preaching,’ preferences for internationally traded goods of people throughout 
the world would indeed change.  Self-suffi ciency would return as the ideal, just 
as it was for Aristotle (Aristotle 1984). In Property as a Guarantor of Freedom, 
Buchanan presented a novel argument for private property as a means to 
guarantee freedom. In doing so, however, he has actually made a case for self-
suffi ciency (or at the very least some optimal mix of trade and freedom from 
trade). Where does this leave Buchanan’s whole ‘contractarian paradigm’? 
Further, and perhaps more importantly, Buchanan has accused various 
Keynesians of political naïvety in their economic theory and especially their 
economic policy (Buchanan and Wagner 1978, p.96; Buchanan and Wagner 
2000, pp.82-3; see also Tobin 1978, p.621). Surely, Buchanan’s argument in 
Property as a Guarantor of Freedom fi ts nicely with a protectionist argument 
by nationalists, who think in ‘organismic’ terms. Is Buchanan guilty of political 
naïvety? For a founder of Public Choice, a sub-discipline of economics 
which is proud of its realpolitik view (or gross cynicism), no graver charge 
could be made. Yet that charge is exactly what Buchanan deserves, given his 
presentation in Property as a Guarantor of Freedom. His rhetorical defence of 
private property may prove to be a gift to those seeking a rhetorical hook for 
protectionism.
(19) Various concerns have been raised in recent years about the quality of food originating from 
the People’s Republic of China.
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James M. Buchanan’s Parable: A Conjectural History of Private 
Property and a Perplexing Argument for Limits on the Market
<Summary>
James E. Alvey
James M. Buchanan won the 1986 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences 
‘for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory 
of economic and political decision-making.’ He developed what he called a 
‘contractarian paradigm’ within economics. Buchanan had eleven foundational 
assumptions and one of these was the pre-eminent place of freedom in the list 
of human values. In Property as a Guarantor of Freedom, Buchanan provides 
us with a novel argument for private property as a means to guarantee freedom. 
In the course of his argument, however, Buchanan relies heavily on ‘exit’ from 
the market as a means of securing freedom.  In doing so, he actually makes a 
case for self-suffi ciency and undermines his ‘contractarian paradigm.’ Secondly, 
Buchanan shows a surprising degree of political naïvety for a leader of the 
Public Choice sub-discipline of economics (which prides itself on its realpolitik
view of the world).  His argument for self-suffi ciency can easily be used by 
nationalists in their call for industry protection. Property as a Guarantor of 
Freedom is a paradox given Buchanan’s other work.
